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Introduction 
The term ‘decriminalisation’ can confuse the discussion about drug policy reform as it means so 
many different things to different people. Indeed many confuse ‘decriminalisation’ with 
‘legalisation’, that is, making some aspect of the drug possession/use no longer an offence. More 
correctly, the term is used to refer to refer to what is termed prohibition with civil penalties, that is, 
much like speeding in a motor vehicle – illegal, not condoned, but only attracting civil penalties like a 
fine, with no further criminal actions taken if the fine is paid by the due date. It is likely that others 
use it as a generic term meaning reducing penalties in comparison to total prohibition with strict 
criminal penalties. The confusion about what decriminalisation means is problematic for a number 
of reasons. Firstly, sensible discussion of drug policy options is impossible when the meanings of 
terms aren’t shared. Secondly, we tend to be scared of what we don’t understand. Consequently, it 
is unsurprising that the latest Nielsen poll has found that public support for ‘decriminalisation’ is low, 
at only 27% (1). Previously it has been found that when the term was explained, support for applying 
prohibition with civil penalties to cannabis use increased from 64% to 72% (2). According to the 
National Drug Strategy Survey Australian public support for criminal penalties for possession of 
cannabis has remained low, ranging from 34% to 39%, in the four surveys conducted between 2001 
and 2010. Interestingly, support for legalisation of cannabis use has been even lower declining from 
31% in 2001 to 25% in 2010. On the other hand, support for allowing use of cannabis for medical 
reasons has been supported by approximately 69% of the general public since the question was first 
posed in the 2004 survey(3, 4).  
Drug policy reform has much more to do with politics that it does with research evidence. In 
translating research evidence into policy proposals for cannabis which contributed to cannabis law 
reform in Western Australia in 2004 it was decided that a concrete proposal would be most likely to 
be enacted if it was: (i) supported by a clear majority of the general public; (ii) Seen as electorally 
survivable by politicians; (iii) Supported by law enforcement stakeholders, notably the police; (iv) 
Supported by cannabis users as better than the prevailing criminal regime; (v) Supported by the 
research evidence; (vi) Sustainable under the international drug treaties and conventions which put 
limitations on signatory countries capacity to implement non-prohibitionist drug law regimes; and 
(vii) Subject to evaluation and review to increase the likelihood that it met the goals that it was 
designed to achieve. (5)  
This paper aims to: (i) clarify drug law reform terms, summarise the evidence and rationale behind 
drug law reform beyond strict criminal penalties; (ii) describe Australian experience of drug law 
reform and some international examples; (iii) briefly describe the impact of the international drug 
treaties on countries capacity to reform their drug laws (iv) and offer some politically viable and 
useful ways forward. 
Terminology on types of reform 
Firstly what needs to be understood is that drug law reform can be undertaken by changing drug 
laws themselves (dejure change), or through leaving the drug laws unchanged ‘on the books’ but 
changing the way the laws are enforced by the police and others (defacto change). There are 
examples of both dejure and defacto reforms in the reform typologies described below.  
Under total prohibition all behaviour in relation to drugs including even minor possession and use of 
small amounts, but also manufacture/cultivation and supply are against the law (illegal) and attract 
strict criminal penalties including a criminal record and possibly a custodial sentence. Under 
prohibition with cautioning or diversion, sometimes called ‘depenalisation’ drug offences remain 
illegal, but under some circumstances penalties are reduced. For example, first offenders who plead 
guilty to minor possession/use offences may avoid a conviction being recorded if they attend and 
successfully complete an education or treatment intervention. Such schemes operate in the UK and 
in all Australian and some US states. Under prohibition with civil penalties, sometimes called 
‘decriminalisation’ all drug related actions remain illegal but certain offences (usually specified small 
possession offences, but not supply offences) are eligible for civil penalties (infringement notices, 
fines administrative sanctions) rather than strict criminal penalties Such schemes apply for specified 
minor cannabis offences in SA, the ACT and the NT. Under Partial prohibition some drug related 
behaviours remain illegal, while others are permitted. This can be done either by defacto or dejure 
means. Under defacto legalisation also termed prohibition with an expediency principle all drug 
related activities are illegal according to the law, however, cases involving defined small quantities 
are not investigated or prosecuted by police. Examples of this system operate for cannabis in 
Belgium and in parts of the Netherlands and Germany. Under dejure legalisation some drug use and 
possession is permitted under the statutes. Examples include the ‘medical marijuana’ schemes of 
regulated availability which apply in parts of the USA and Canada, and in Alaska where cannabis 
possession in one’s home is not an offence.  
Australia’s 25yr experience of drug policy reform 
Note that whilst many people think that total prohibition laws that apply to drugs in Australia, it is 
clear from the above that this is not the case. Prohibition with civil penalties schemes were 
introduced for minor cannabis offences in South Australia in 1987, the Australian Capital Territory in 
1992, the Northern Territory in 1996 and in Western Australia from 2004 to 2011. Furthermore 
prohibition with cautioning and diversion schemes were introduced for cannabis in the non-civil 
penalty jurisdictions and for all other illegal drugs (heroin, amphetamines cocaine, LSD, ecstasy, etc.) 
for all Australian states and territories under the Illicit Drug Diversion Initiative (IDDI) introduced 
under the Howard Government in 1999 (6). That is, for drug possession offenders, depending on the 
jurisdiction, for first, second or third offences drug offenders without prior violent offences are given 
the option of having their prosecution suspended whilst they complete an intervention, usually drug 
treatment, specified by the caution. Should this be successful, they are not prosecuted for their drug 
offence. 
So, Australia has a 25 year history of drug law reforms beyond total prohibition. This has happened 
under both national and state and territory governments of the left and the right political 
persuasion. Granted, these reforms have been limited in scope, have rarely addressed the supply 
side of the drug issue, may only apply to first offenders, and still result in many drug users who come 
into contact with the law getting criminal charges. However, to describe the Australian experience as 
simply a ‘War on Drugs’ approach is a caricature which ignores and diminishes the attempts which 
have been made to mitigate, if not remove, the adverse impacts of the criminal law on drug users. 
Are there more sensible and practical things which can be done to reform drug laws in this country? 
– without doubt. But in many ways Australia began moving beyond a ‘war on drugs’ at least 2 
decades ago, and we will see below that the evidence is that, despite these reforms, ‘the sky hasn’t 
fallen in’. 
The evidence 
Much of the evidence regarding the impact of policy options for drugs has been based on the most 
prevalent illicit drug – cannabis. There is no evidence that maintaining the illegality of cannabis 
(prohibition) but applying civil rather than criminal penalties to minor cannabis offences results in 
higher rates of cannabis use among the general population, school children, nor apprehended 
cannabis users. Support for this position comes from research evidence from a variety of converging 
sources (see 7) including: (i) criminological research on deterrence; (ii) studies of the impact of 
reducing drug penalties on rates of use; and (iii) studies demonstrating the impacts of being 
apprehended for a minor cannabis offence. 
Deterrence theory and drug policy research 
The theoretical underpinning of much of our criminal law, and general and our drug law in particular, 
is classical deterrence theory which asserts that “undesirable behaviour can be curtailed if 
punishment is sufficiently certain, swift, and severe” (8). Much of the early criminological research 
showed that individuals’ perceptions of punishment likelihood, rather than punishment severity, 
deterred further offending. Furthermore, in situations where likelihood of detection is low, or hard 
to estimate, factors other than the law are likely to be more important determinants of behaviour 
(7).  
In mostly private behaviours such as illegal drug use, the likelihood of detection is extremely low. For 
cannabis, the likelihood of someone being apprehended for using the drug in any one year is 
between 1 and 3 % (9). Given the number of episodes of use of the typical cannabis user in one year, 
the risk per episode of use is probably less than 0.01% (7).It is thus unsurprising that research shows 
there is little relationship between rates of cannabis and whether strict criminal penalties or civil 
penalties apply. Those who believe that more law enforcement is the way to deter cannabis use, 
need to ask themselves what level of policing, and the associated public expenditure required, could 
get the detection rate per episode above the current 1% to a level where detection was ‘certain’. 
Studies of the impacts of reducing penalties on rates of drug use 
Policy impact research on ‘natural experiments’ where penalties have been reduced for minor 
cannabis offences does not show that such measures result in higher rates of cannabis use in the 
general community. Eleven US States which ‘decriminalised’ cannabis during the 1970’s. Research 
showed that those states which removed criminal penalties did not experience greater increases in 
cannabis use among adults or adolescents, nor more favourable attitudes towards the drug, than 
those states which maintained strict prohibition against cannabis possession and use (e.g. 10). 
Research on the impact of the South Australian Cannabis Expiation Notice system concluded that 
rates of recent (weekly) use, and use among young adults and school students had not increased at a 
greater rate in South Australia compared to other states which had not liberalised their laws (11). 
The experience of the introduction of a prohibition with civil penalty scheme in WA in 2004, which 
was overturned in 2011 after a change of government, suggested that the scheme did not result in 
increased cannabis use in that state among the general public, regular cannabis users, nor school 
students, nor did it result in a ‘softening’ of attitudes to cannabis. Indeed the prevalence of cannabis 
in WA had been declining since the late 1990s as it has done elsewhere in Australia and there was a 
growing recognition of the health harms associated with the drug, particularly harms associated with 
heavy and early use (12). Beyond impacts on use and attitudes, a variety of studies have shown that 
applying civil penalties for cannabis use results in savings to the criminal justice system, with the size 
of the savings depending on the size of the jurisdiction and the way the scheme is implemented (13-
15). 
A cross-national comparison between the Netherlands, other European states and the USA, showed 
that despite the introduction of defacto legalisation of cannabis through the cannabis coffeeshops, 
the Dutch did not have higher rates of cannabis use than these other countries (16). Separate to the 
legal changes, an increase in commercial access to cannabis, associated with the growth in numbers 
of cannabis coffeeshops from 1992 to 1996, may have resulted in growth in the cannabis using 
population, including young people (16-19) but this growth has put the rates of cannabis use no 
higher than that in the USA (16) and declined when restrictions on the number of coffeeshops and 
the age of patrons were introduced (20). In 2004 the UK government reduced penalties for cannabis 
use downgrading it from a Class B to a Class C drug. Cannabis use among adults and children 
continued to decline after the change (21).  
In The Czech Republic, cannabis and other drugs were criminalised in 1998. A two year evaluation 
found that, while the implementation of the laws was far from universal, there was no evidence that 
it resulted in any reduction of drug use, but there were clear and substantial economic costs to the 
state (22). Liberalisation of drug laws in Portugal occurred in 2001. Under these reforms drug 
acquisition and possession became an administrative offence, but drug supply remained a criminal 
offence. The laws apply to use/possession of up to 10 days worth of all illicit drugs. Sanctions for the 
new offences are applied by specially constituted Commissions for the Dissuasion of Drug Addiction 
(CDTs). Their goal is to dissuade drug use and refer drug dependent people into treatment, whilst 
those assessed as being non-dependent or functioning users may have their proceedings suspended, 
be required to attend a police station, be referred for psychological or educational intervention, or 
receive a fine (23). In some ways this is the converse to the Australian prohibition with cautioning or 
diversion schemes which limit cautions and interventions to first, second or third offenders. In the 
Portuguese system it is the entrenched drug offenders who are referred for treatment and the less 
entrenched receive civil penalties. However, Whilst there has been conflicting claims that the 
Portuguese reforms have been a ‘resounding success’ or a ‘disastrous failure’, it is most likely neither 
are fair representations(24). Limitations with available data, means it has not been possible to 
definitively gauge the impacts of these changes (25),however, the Portuguese reforms do not appear 
to have led to a substantial increase in drug use or related harms (23). 
Another interesting alternative model are the cannabis social clubs which originated in Spain where, 
due to a quirk of law, cannabis possession and use by adults in private is not illegal, but supply for 
profit is criminalised. Under this arrangement a collective of cannabis users band together to grow 
cannabis for their own consumption (and in some cases for gifting to medical users), but not for sale 
outside the closed system of the club. The clubs monitor member’s health, and address the supply 
issue whilst aiming to mitigate against commercialism. However the Spanish clubs are not subject to 
government regulation and have grown in number to around 300 (26). Furthermore, there are 
reports of organised commercial distributors setting up new ‘clubs’ as a front for cannabis supply, 
which may undermine political and public support and the integrity of the original clubs (27). 
However, in Spain and elsewhere, proposals are being drafted to develop regulations to support the 
integrity of the cannabis clubs as originally developed. It will be interesting to see how this approach 
develops. 
Impacts of being apprehended for a minor drug offence 
In a comparison of the social impacts of a conviction under strict cannabis prohibition in place at the 
time in Western Australia, with that of an infringement notice under the CEN system in South 
Australia the experiences of 68 matched first-time apprehended cannabis users from each of these 
states were examined (28, 29). Importantly, neither the infringement notice nor the cannabis 
conviction appeared to have much impact on subsequent cannabis use. Rates of post-apprehension 
cannabis use were highly correlated with rates of use prior to apprehension, consistent with earlier 
Canadian research (e.g. 30, 31). However, those in the WA convicted group were significantly more 
likely than the South Australian infringement notice group to report: adverse employment 
consequences; further contact with the criminal justice system; relationship problems, and 
accommodation difficulties that could be attributed to their apprehension for the cannabis offence. 
Cannabis users arrested and convicted for the first time in Western Australia were more likely to 
report negative attitudes to police and the justice system and be less trusting of police than their 
South Australian counterparts who received an infringement notice.(see 7).  
Impact of the international drug treaties 
Australia, like almost all countries, is signatory to the 1961 Single Convention on Drugs and the 1988 
Vienna Convention, which to together require what are defined as ‘narcotic’ drugs (effectively all 
illicit drugs including cannabis) to be treated as punishable offences under signature countries 
domestic law, except for medical and scientific purposes. While interpretations of the drug 
conventions differ, most commentators agree that the conventions require trafficking offences to be 
criminal, but that cultivation and possession for personal use must be punishable, but not 
necessarily criminal (32, 33). Beyond this, whilst it is clear that the treaties act upon national laws of 
signatory countries, the extent to which they are binding at the sub-national or state level is unclear.  
Consistent the above, there is experience showing that prohibition with civil penalty systems like 
those in place for cannabis in eleven US states and SA, the ACT and NT are not in breach of the 
treaties. Also consistent with the treaties are the prohibition with cautioning schemes that operate 
in the other Australian jurisdictions and the defacto legalisation or prohibition with an expediency 
principle schemes that operate for cannabis in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. The latter 
are consistent because the drug offences remain illegal on the statutes, even though cases involving 
defined small quantities are not investigated or prosecuted by police. The North American medical 
marijuana initiatives whilst de jure are permitted under the treaties as they invoke the ‘except for 
medical treatment’ clause.  
However, clearly the international drug conventions have impeded countries from going beyond 
prohibition options to trial and evaluate more comprehensive legislative reforms. This is a significant 
barrier to accruing evidence to inform future drug policy reform (34). 
Where more evidence is needed 
There is no doubt that all drug law reform options have their strengths and weaknesses (See 33, 35). 
Whilst the evidence for the minimal impact on rates of use moving from total prohibition with strict 
criminal penalties to prohibition with civil penalties is relatively strong, the evidence for the impacts 
of prohibition with cautioning schemes on populations or individuals drug use is relatively scant (e.g. 
36). Although politically popular and often supported by the drug treatment sector for who such 
schemes provide often needed financial support from government, evidence of their effectiveness is 
yet to accrue. Such cautioning schemes are far cheaper than incarceration, give offenders a chance 
to address their problems and avoid criminalisation, but there are concerns that tying up treatment 
places with minor drug offenders may not be the best use of this valuable resource. Questions also 
remain whether most of those diverted engage effectively with treatment or may be more willing to 
do so in future. Also, given that only about 3% of cannabis users have contact with the criminal 
justice system in any one year, it is questionable whether a system built around cannabis users is 
ideal, even if we assumed that the majority of those apprehended had significant cannabis use 
problems. 
Whilst cogent arguments can be mounted in favour of legalisation of drugs under a strictly regulated 
model (e.g. 37) many public health experts have serious concerns about putting currently illegal 
drugs like cannabis in the hands of commercial interests and replicating the problems of promotion 
and high rates of use and harm that we have seen with alcohol and tobacco (e.g. 38). A major issue 
here is that evidence on which to base decisions about likely impacts of regulatory or commercial 
schemes is lacking (35) and whilst attempts to estimate the impacts of such changes suggest rates of 
use will probably increase (39), the magnitude of such an increase and the impact on drug related 
harm are contested (40-42). 
A practical way forward 
 
Building on the successful Australian approach 
As argued above, evidence is only part of the drug policy process. Yet sensible drug policy is not 
harmed by accruing new evidence. The Australian approach of cautious and evaluated reforms has, 
to date, contributed to accruing valuable evidence on which to base further reforms. As Australia is a 
federation and drug law is state law this has enabled diversity on drug laws to co-exist which has 
made this country an ideal laboratory for investigating and comparing different approaches to drug 
policy.  
Expanding the evidence base 
This is an approach which we should advocate for at the international level. In many countries the 
problems with the application of prohibition with strict criminal penalties to minor drug possession 
and use offences is apparent. Yet although application of civil penalties and cautioning schemes have 
mitigated some of these, and reduced the criminal justice costs, drug supply is left in the hands of 
the illicit market and significant number of citizens still get a criminal record as a result of using these 
drugs. Similarly the defacto legalisation schemes in countries like the Netherlands and the medical 
cannabis schemes in place in North America are compromised by ‘workarounds’ which have been 
made to ensure their survival under the constraints of the international drug treaties.  
International treaties 
However, Australia and other countries capacity to conduct carefully conducted and evaluated policy 
experiments beyond prohibition is limited by the current provisions of the international drug 
conventions. Elsewhere it has been suggested how the international treaties could be modified to 
allow carefully evaluated drug policy reform trials while allowing states to operate under the current 
treaties, if that is what they prefer (33). Australia, with its history of more than two decades of 
cautious and evaluated drug policy reforms, is ideally situated to advocate for this approach at the 
international level.  
Helpful public debate 
Public debate on drug policy is often polarised and this is fuelled by entrenched positions of some of 
the protagonists, a polarisation which is frequently exacerbated by the media’s framing of the issues. 
In this context public discourse about drug policy reform can be beneficial if it leads to an engaged 
and informed consideration of a range of policy options by the public and policy makers alike. 
However, if the debate is going to be characterised by more light and less heat, then terminology 
needs to be clear. Using unclear terms like ‘decriminalisation’ will confuse the public debate, will be 
taken by many to mean ‘legalisation’ in a commercial model, and will lead politicians, who must be 
engaged in consideration of reform options, to run from the public debate.  
Engaging with policy makers 
Having a framework for the policy change process can assist in engaging political and policy 
stakeholders in the policy process. Kingdon’s Multiple Streams model (43) has been useful in 
informing and describing drug policy reforms in Australia (44). In a nutshell Kingdon argues that 
windows of opportunity for policy change open when three streams come together: an 
understanding that there is a problem which needs to be addressed by a policy response, events in 
the political stream which allow political engagement with an issue, and emergence of economically 
feasible and politically viable policy responses. Whilst all of these factors can be canvassed in the 
public debate, engagement with active political and policy stakeholders often needs to be done out 
of the public spotlight within a trusting relationship where there is space to consider the evidence 
and craft viable political and policy positions. Without this kind of engagement it is likely that public 
discourse about drug policy will remain a talk fest and won’t result in real further drug policy reform. 
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